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Abstract Sumantra Ghoshal’s condemnation of Bbad management theories^ that were
Bdestroying good management practices^ has not lost any of its salience, after a decade.
Management theories anchored in agency theory (and neo-classical economics generally)
continue to abet the financialization of society and undermine the functioning of business.
An alternative approach (drawn from a more classic institutional, new ecological, and
refocused ethical approaches) is reviewed.
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London Business School Professor, Sumantra Ghoshal (2005) caused a furor, albeit fleeting,
with his assertion that Bbad management theories^ were Bdestroying good management
practices^. Ghoshal took academics to task for promulgating false and morally suspect ideas
and insisted that they were partly to blame for managerial actions in a number of corporate
scandals (e.g., Enron and Tyco). Ghoshal echoed the earlier concerns of business ethicists (e.g.,
Bowie and Freeman 1992) that scholarship and teaching (especially in leading US business
schools) was anointing an increasingly self-destructive worldview derived from neo-classical
and neo-institutional (e.g., Williamson 1985) economic theory and applied to critical issues of
corporate strategy and governance. The on-going financial crisis, which came to public
attention in 2008, has more than vindicated his contentions; and yet, both the financialization
of society and the pedagogy proceed apace.
We revisit and re-develop Ghoshal’s criticisms and show that business schools have yet to
fully acknowledge how their role in the crisis demands the rehabilitation of management
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theory. Though there has been some progress in adding business ethics, corporate social
responsibility, and sustainability curriculum, there has been less assessment of the nature or
purposes of management theory itself. Management theory, in its quest for rigor and scientific
legitimacy, has continued to draw heavily on economic ideas that are either in themselves
questionable or have limited application for management. The formulation of a more adequate
management theory demands a critical analysis of the role of business in society and a
reexamination of how the social sciences best inform management practices.
What is needed is a positive research program that allows theorists to move toward a new
management paradigm. Ghoshal and others have mounted impressive criticisms of manage-
ment theories informed by the neo-classical synthesis, but have not offered a systematic,
alternative framework that draws on other developments in social sciences. Management
theorists, if they are to compete with the dominant paradigm exemplified by the Chicago
School, need another set of concepts and tools to move forward. In particular, they need to
combine a theory of human agency, a conception of the firm, and a diagnosis of the larger
social and economic world. Our goals are to build upon and reinforce criticisms put forward by
other scholars against what Ghoshal dubbed Bbad management theories^ (2005) and also to
begin to define an intellectual space for better theories to emerge.
Bad Management Theory in the Age of Finance Über Alles
Ghoshal’s central claim is that management as a profession has been damaged by the prevailing
economic paradigm that combines neo-classical models with the values and practices of the
current age of financial capitalism.Management theorists exported mistaken assumptions about
rationality from neoclassical micro-economics that do not accurately represent human nature,
allow for the construction of plausible moral agents, or support a cogent moral theory.
As Ghoshal points out, neo-classical notions not only came to dominate economics courses,
they pervaded management curriculum generally. He associates this contagion with the rise of
Agency Theory (see: Eisenhardt 1989) which maintains that primary role of management is to
adjust the interests of the managers (agents) with those of the shareholders (principals).
Ghoshal chronicles how this theory as well as the tools of neo-classical organizational
economics (e.g., transaction costs) came to pervade courses in corporate governance, organi-
zational design and corporate strategy. Building upon Ghoshal, Matthias Huehn (2008)
maintains that a virulent strain of Bunenlightened economism^ was transmitted into the society
at large via the BTrojan Horse^ of management theory. This allowed a misguided Bideology^
to displace a Bscientific research programme^. This is the real impact of Ghoshal’s indictment
that we refer to as his ghost; in essence, leading business schools have fortified this socially
destructive ideological movement by disseminating dubious theories. This movement, which
corresponds to the widespread financialization of society (see: Dore 2008; Christopherson
et al. 2013), undermines the basic empirical as well as ethical functions of business enterprise
and may even portend the end of management theory per se.
Finance, of course, is a vital element of all business enterprises, but the concept of
financialization connotes a distortion of these basic activities so that the finance tail not only
wags, but also eats the management dog. The financialization of the firm, which corresponded
to the assertion of the shareholder primacy, was merely the tip of the iceberg. The financial
services industry, broadly defined as FIRE (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), became in the
words of Kevin Phillips (2006), Bthe dominant economic, cultural, and political role in the
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national economy (p. 268).^ While financial institutions (e.g., underwriting and trade compa-
nies, corporate trusts and investment banks) have reigned over the bulk of economic activity in
the past (especially prior to the US Civil War, the BGilded Age^ prior to WWI and prior to the
Great Depression and WWII), the current financial epoch is unprecedented in scale and scope,
and its current influence upon managerial activity is immense. The most troubling aspect of
this re-established deus ex machina is the unparallelled level of political protection (ergo the
Btoo big to fail^ banks) and how this edifice was carefully constructed and cloaked in Bfree
market^ rhetoric (see: Mirowski 2013; also note: Stedman-Jones 2012). What is now called
Bfinancialization^ comprises a number of societal processes. As Gerald Epstein (2005)
summarizes, Bfinancialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial
markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic
and international economies (p.3).^ Greta Krippner (2005) further defines it as a
Bpattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial
channels rather than through trade and commodity production (p.174).^ A hallmark of
financialization, according to Ronald Dore (2008), is Bthe increasingly strident asser-
tion of the property rights of owners as transcending all other forms of social
accountability for business corporations^ (p. 1098). This assertion of property rights
has primarily taken the form of shareholder value maximization – in fact, some see
shareholder primacy as the foundational ideology for our present hyper-financialized
epoch (van der Zwan 2014).
Myopic Meaning of Management
The dominant management philosophy became the handmaiden of the new and increasingly
destructive version of global finance, despite alternative approaches in the scholarly literature.
Some scholars have reintroduced neo-Keynesian approaches after the global financial crisis
(Whalen 2013). Critical Management Studies (Grey and Willmott 2005) has received a fair
amount of attention with its incorporation of post-structuralist (Jones 2009), Marxian (Adler
2007), and feminist insights (Martin 2003). Ecological and evolutionary approaches (Daneke
1999; Haidt and Wilson 2013) such as the one we advocate here also have some traction
among theorists. Nonetheless, these alternatives have not been able to displace even a small
portion of the dominant neo-classical economics paradigm in the majority of business schools.
Despite their complicity in the on-going global financial crisis (Krugman 2009), most business
school economists remain firmly unrepentant. One of most powerful and pernicious manifes-
tations of neo-classical model of the firm is the exaltation of shareholder interests. As Susan
Murray (2013) reported, once the shareholder primacy model was firmly implanted into
leading US business schools it would not be easily extricated, especially from within the
burgeoning finance, accounting, and business law departments. Despite much controversy
(see: Freeman and Bowie 1992), the myopic viewpoint that the sole responsibility of man-
agement was to increase shareholder value has become thoroughly embedded in business
scholarship, especially in the U.S.
From the blending of neo-classical economics, contract law, and organizational inquiry, this
trend was substantially buttressed by the advent of agency theory. Agency theory sought to
resolve conflicts between principals and agents, especially under circumstances of uncertainty
and of asymmetrical information, where the principals (managers) are expected to shortchange
the agents (shareholders) of their rightful share of the profits. The principal-agent problem is
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based on the assumption that there is always a potential conflict between the desired outcomes
of the principal and the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 308). Jensen and Meckling endorse
a conception of human nature that sees people as Bresourceful, evaluative maximizers^ who
Brespond creatively to the opportunities the environment presents them… and work to loosen
constraints that prevent them from doing what they wish to do.^ (Jensen and Meckling 1994:
19). When applied to the relationship between managers and shareholders, Jensen’s model of
human nature maintains that managers (agents) must be incentivized to act in the interests of
shareholders (principals) and that firms must be structured to mitigate self-interested behavior.
Particular recommendations include using stock options to compensate executives, de-
diversifying industries, the use of debt rather than profit to finance new projects, and
encouraging more independent boards to exercise increased oversight of managers.
The philosophy of shareholder primacy rose to canon law despite its reliance on a mistaken
interpretation of corporate law – shareholders neither Bown^ the firm, they are not the sole
residual claimants, nor are managers legally agents of shareholders (Stout 2012: 22–46, c.f.
Smith and Ronnegard 2014) – and despite mixed results from the perspective of shareholder
interest (Dobbin and Jung 2010). Meanwhile, the notion that managers had broader respon-
sibility to stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large) declined
with the Business Roundtable policy statement moving from a broad acknowledgement of
responsibility to stakeholders in 1990 to an almost exclusive focus on shareholders by 1997
(Khurana 2007: 320–1)
Much of the intellectual infrastructure of shareholder primacy was provided by Oliver
Williamson (1975 and 1985). It was Williamson (1964) who originally identified Bmanagerial
discretion^ as a hypothetical problem back in the 1960s. Seeking to defend neo-classical
economics against the Bbehavioral theory of the firm^ (Cyert and March 1963), he refashioned
institutional analysis to exclude the cultural factors so vital to traditional institutional econom-
ics (e.g., Veblen, Common, etc.). Williamson built an elaborate organizational edifice with
Pareto efficiency as the only legitimizing process. Williamson went well beyond basic self-
interest with the stronger notion of opportunism in which individuals are constantly engaged in
strategic behavior in pursuit of personal advantage. Opportunistic human nature lends itself to
a conception of the organization that relies on hierarchical control: Babsent opportunism, there
is no contractual reason to supplant market by hierarchy.^ (Williamson 1998: 31) The result
enshrined shareholder primacy as the dominant managerial paradigm.
Just as Williamson shifted the unit of analysis from the rational individual to the boundedly
rational transaction, economists who studied industrial organization needed new concepts of
competition. Game theorists had already saved neo-classical theory from its flawed notions of
equilibrium by substituting strategic processes (Nash Equilibrium) for Walrus’s mythical
auctioneer. Michael Porter (1980, 1985) extends the logic of games to the level of entire
industries and shows how firms co-exist rather than compete. According to Porter, firms seek
to find their ecological niche via a field of Bfive forces^: 1) industry competitors, 2) new rivals,
3) substitute products and services, 4) the bargaining power of suppliers, and 5) the bargaining
power of buyers. A successful Bstrategy can be viewed as building defenses against the
competitive forces or as finding positions in the industry where the forces are weakest.^
(Porter 1980: 30) Essentially strategy boils down to avoiding competition.
While brilliant at the game-theoretic and textbook level, in application Bsustainable
advantage^ is illusive. The most successful element appears to be manipulating government
regulators into erecting barriers to new entrants (see: Stewart 2009). In a hyper-financialized
economy, it is not even clear that the shareholders were all that well served by Porter. As his
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Harvard colleague Clayton Christensen (1997) suggests, those firms that thought they had
found their defensible niche, and financed themselves out of R&D, were displaced by
technological advances. At root the five forces assume a static, zero-sum account of the
economy, rather than a dynamic, positive sum game made possible by innovations (Ghoshal
and Barlett 1997: 276). Porter asks companies to appropriate value from their employees, their
customers, their suppliers, and rival companies. The problem with this view of strategy,
according to Ghoshal, Bartlett, and Moran (1999) is that Bthe interests of the company are
incompatible with those of society.^ (p.12) They add that, under Porter’s five forces, BThe
destruction of social welfare is not just a coincidental by-product of strategy; it is the
fundamental objective of profit-seeking firms and, therefore, of their managers^ (p.12).
Porter’s approach to competition reduces business to value extraction rather than value
creation (Ghoshal, Bartlett, and Moran 1999).
These three theories combine to the detriment of managers who follow their prescriptions.
In Ghoshal’s words:
Combine agency theory with transaction costs economics, add in standard versions of
game theory and negotiation analysis, and the picture of the manager that emerges is one
that is now very familiar in practice: the ruthlessly hard-driving, strictly top-down,
command-and-control focused, shareholder, value-obsessed, win-at-any-cost business
leader of which Scott Paper’s BChainsaw^ Al Dunlap and Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski are
only the most extreme examples (Ghoshal 2005: 85).
Management in CRISIS: Plus ça Change, Plus c'est la Même Chose
Ghoshal saw a direct link between ideology and business scholarship and scandals at the turn
of the new millennium (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco), but leading business schools have
not yet fully acknowledged these links. The burst of the dot com bubble provoked a flurry of
articles and conferences among management theorists calling for more attention to ethics in
business schools (Adler 2002; Melé 2008). The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business convened a task force that issued a report with a series of recommendations that
business schools increasingly integrate ethics into their curricula (AACSB International 2004).
Surveys of students routinely suggest a growing concern for ethical issues. Christensen and her
colleagues (2007), found that in 2006 72% of the top 50 business schools in the Financial
Times Ratings had a Net Impact Chapter – a proxy for student interest in CSR and sustain-
ability – and that a third of the 50 top global MBA programs included ethics, corporate social
responsibility, and sustainability in the curriculum. They also noted a number of new centers
and institutes dedicated to ethical topics. The Aspen Institute Beyond Grey Pinstripes survey
reported a marked increase in required courses in social, ethical, and environmental issues,
including an increase from 34% in 2001 to 79% in 2011 of schools that have a required course
on business and society issues1and a decline from 75% in 2001 to 64% in 2007 of MBA
students who view the primary responsibilities of a company to include the maximization of
shareholder value (West 2011). Though these developments are encouraging, they are periph-
eral to Ghoshal’s criticisms. Management theory itself has not fundamentally changed since
the turn of the millennium (Hühn 2014).
1 http://www.beyondgreypinstripes.org/data-analysis
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The problem is that management theorists have tended to see the normative issues of
business to be a matter of applied ethics concerning the obligations of individual managers or
companies. This results in the conceptualization of business – e.g., its responsibilities toward
shareholders and stakeholders – in isolation from broader institutions (Heath et al. 2010).
Ethics is too often identified with a set of abstract theories – utilitarianism, deontology, social
contract theory, virtue ethics, etc.—or with indeterminate deliberation on hard cases
(Donaldson 2008: 303–4). More Bpractical^ approaches frequently reduce ethics to adminis-
trative or legal rules – e.g., codes of conduct or guidelines for avoiding conflicts of interest.
These approaches to business ethics education distract management professors from rethinking
the role of business, the nature of management, and the larger socio-economic-legal system.
Moreover, the effects of education on people’s behavior are complex. Isolated courses in
ethics, sustainability, or corporate social responsibility are unlikely to have a major impact on
future managers’ actions (Waples et al. 2009).
Instead, the normative issues confronting managers need to be situated in complex social,
legal, and political systems with attention to the feedback mechanisms between public policy
and private enterprise. Given the dominance of agency theory’s model of human nature, its
view of markets, and its normative vision of society in many business circles, it is necessary to
refute or at least cast into doubt many of the ideas drawn from neoclassical economics, to show
how these ideas reduce social wellbeing, and to offer an empirically plausible and normatively
viable sketch of an alternative theoretical framework.
A More Social Science
Management theories are both social sciences and societal technologies. The grandfather of
behavioral and complexity economics, Herbert Simon (1996), maintains that most social
sciences, and particularly those involved in the administration of human affairs, are actually
Bdesign sciences^ (more like architecture and engineering). As a design science for the social
world, management is a normative project. Management is a social technology and all
technologies have a telos (a purpose). Management has explicit normative aims embedded
in its nature and exists to fulfill certain social functions. As such, it is an ethical enterprise
(Solomon 1993, 2004).
The artificial separation of business and ethics and of economics and politics is only
possible because of a misconception of the basic nature of management due in part to its
reliance on the value-free mythology of neo-classical economics. Business schools chose to
emphasize neo-classical economics without careful attention to its actual scientific integrity or
its ideological baggage (see: Mirowski 1991, 2004; Schlefer 2012). The economics taught in
business schools remains to this day largely ahistorical and path independent, and with little
concern for socio-cultural evolution. The conceptual limitations of neo-classical economics,
particularly when it is applied to the theory of the firm, emerge from a normative view of
human nature, business, and the good society. More damningly, the ideas of neo-classical
economics presented as truths about human nature and necessary restrictions on markets and
firms, entail a deterministic world view in which current arrangements are more or less
inevitable (Ghoshal 2005: 79).
In neo-classical theory, rationality is defined as the instrumental reasoning of self-interested
individuals satisfying their preferences. Though agency theory allows for partially bounded
rationality and herd responses explained using behavioral economics (e.g., Simon 1959), homo
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economicus remains pretty much intact and serves as a foundation for business education. For
the most part this narrow caricature of economic man (person), as rational, self-interested,
hedonist (maximizing their individual utility at the margin) is translated into institutionalized
expectations. As employed by Williamson, Jensen, etc., agency theory is not neutral with
regard to behavior. Rather, it assumes the worst.
A new social scientific foundation is needed, one anchored to our basic understandings of
human behavior and socio-cultural evolution. As Ghoshal explains, Bcommon sense has, of
course, always recognized that human behavior can be influenced by other motives. Increas-
ingly, empirical evidence provides overwhelming support to what common sense suggests^
(Ghoshal 2005: 83). Some of the more interesting empirical work extends the insights from the
study of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990) with earlier institutional inquiries (e.g., Veblen
and Commons) toward an understanding of the cooperative basis of human enterprise. This
research draws upon anthropology, psychology, behavioral economics, and game theory as
well as recent advances in computational sciences (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis, et al.
2005; Henrich et al. 2005; and Henrich 2006). These studies combine ethnographic field work
with experiments, as well as simulations of artificial adaptive agents (the latter providing Ban
artificial reality check for economists^). They explore the flourishing of what they call Bhomo-
reciprocans^ (boundedly rational, other-regarding, and relentlessly seeking fairness) and they
illustrate how these socially oriented behaviors participate in institutional change and socio-
cultural evolution (Gintis et al. 2005; Bowles and Gintis 2011). Among other things, this
research allows for the possibility of altruistic behaviors having significant cultural presence.
Heretofore those economists who admitted that altruism even existed merely assumed that it
would be destroyed in the aggregate by all the greedy agents. In contrast, it is often the
selfishness that is crowded out by other-regarding behavior (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
Throughout human history, other-regarding motivations are paramount (see: Boehm 2012),
and despite economists’ attempts to convince us otherwise, these and similar values (e.g.,
justice) shape behavior (see: Gintis 2006). People care about others’ well-being and view their
own well-being as bound up in the fate of others. In fact, an examination of the anthropological
record demonstrates how remarkably little opportunistic behavior actually occurs (Boehm
2012). Social sanctions against opportunistic behavior functioned precisely because most
members of the group had internalized cooperation and altruism as the norm. As Elizabeth
Anderson shows, neither rational choice theory nor evolutionary theory has been able to fully
explain people’s commitment to social norms. Instead, an explanation of practical reasoning
needs an account of homo sociologicus (Anderson 2000: 171) in which action derives from
people’s self-understanding – what counts as a reason depends on the fact that people
Bunderstand one another to be jointly committed to some goal, belief, or principle of action.^
(p.192).
Management Breaking Bad
This is not merely an academic debate. Agency theorists make a suspect inference from the
observation that people can be self-interested or opportunistic to the claim that the primary
consideration in designing institutions is the reduction of self-interested or opportunistic
behavior. Humans are reflexive animals who not only interpret the world but also interpret
themselves. For this reason, social scientific theories can create self-fulfilling prophecies
(Ferraro et al. 2005; Giddens 1984). People’s degree of opportunism may depend on
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institutional structures and on assumptions people have learned about people’s likelihood to
behave opportunistically (Ghoshal 2005: 77).
To the extent that management is a social process, it is inexorably interwoven with
imposition of societal values. The entanglement of fact and value does not necessarily erect
a barrier to scientific understanding and explanation (Putnam 2002). It does, however, demand
that scientists think carefully about and justify the values embedded in their theories and
practices. Management is a normative enterprise that seeks to intervene in the social and
economic worlds and that either explicitly or implicitly contains a theory of ethics. Business is
justified by its ability to produce and distribute goods and services more effectively than
alternative institutions and management’s purpose is to facilitate this.
This brings management into the scope of political philosophy. Business is essentially a set
of social arrangements that Bdistribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the
divisions of advantages from social cooperation^ (Rawls 1999: 6) and include Bthe legally
recognized forms of property, and the structure of the economy^ (Rawls 2001: 10). Business
interacts with other legal, political, and social institutions to determine the distribution of
resources (Moriarty 2005). It is thus subject to philosophical criticism and justification
regarding its role in promoting or undermining distributive justice.
Though Robert Solomon called for an approach to business ethics that integrates studies of
the corporation and individual behavior within larger questions of justice twenty five years ago
(Solomon 1990), there has been limited dialogue between business ethicists and political
philosophers (Heath et al. 2010; see: Donaldson and Dunfree 1994; and McMahon 1994 for
notable exceptions). In fact, the only well worked out political philosophy that integrates
Bmicro-level business ethics and midlevel corporate governance in theories of the firm and a
macro-level justification of markets and government regulations^ (Norman 2012: 35) is the
Chicago School. The Chicago School’s normative assumptions are cloaked in supposedly
value-free claims about the social science of individual agency and the nature of the firm that
we have been criticizing. Moreover, many political philosophers reject its conception about the
proper relationship between government and markets on conceptual and normative grounds.
Unfortunately, these critics have for the most part neglected how macro-level theories of
justice should inform and be informed by meso-level theories of the firm and by micro-level
theories about individual agency. This has allowed management theorists to incorporate the
assumptions of the Chicago school without considering viable alternatives.
Management theorists need to reflect on the principles of distributive justice (Rawls 1999;
also note: Alexander 2000) and ask how business contributes to the distribution of benefits and
burdens across society. Business and markets serve to create value in conjunction with other
institutions (e.g., political rules governing redistribution). The question is how they are able to
more efficiently produce and more justly distribute goods and services. Reasonable people
disagree about the basis and scope of distributive justice and the institutions that are most
likely to meet its requirements. Nonetheless, bringing the insights of political philosophy into
management theory will not occur until there are well-developed alternatives to the Chicago
School that make their normative commitments explicit.
There are already well-developed theories in political philosophy that offer political theories
that combine micro-level accounts of moral agency with macro-level accounts of distributive
justice. One way forward would be to work within the liberal egalitarian tradition established by
John Rawls to situate management theory within a larger vision of distributive justice as well as
an account of individuals as moral agents (Mazie 2011). Another possibility would be to follow
Amartya Sen who has also developed his capability approach and his work on agency,
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rationality, and democracy into a theory of justice (Sen 2011). Candidates in the utilitarian,
libertarian, feminist, and Marxian traditions also deserve consideration (Lamont and Christi
2014). Philosophers of management need to engage with these theories and see how they can
integrate the meso-level of the firm and more generally explore their implications for business.
Whatever the precise contours of a plausible vision of justice, agency theory and the
Chicago school miss the mark. The normative debate between agency theory and its critics
centers on the distinction between value destruction and creation. The prime directive of
management is value creation, broadly defined. As Ghoshal, Bartlett, and Moran (1999)
observe, companies exist precisely because markets do not create value. We need firms which
allow for purposive adaptation to situations in which market mechanisms are not present.
Beyond the need for managers to create value if they are to play a role in a just society, we
need to ask about the distributive effect of management practices. Business alone does not
determine the distribution of benefits and burdens across society, but its practices – and how
these practices are regulated—are momentous.
Ghoshal’s case against agency theory can be buttressed by showing how the on-going
financial crisis teaches us that much of what passes for management actually destroys value.
David Korten (2010) contends that much of business scholarship does not distinguish between
Bphantom wealth and real wealth^, the former being essentially destructive of societal value.
Korten explains that phantom wealth
…includes financial assets created by debt pyramids in which financial institutions
engage in complex trading and lending schemes using fictitious or overvalued assets
as collateral for loans in order to feed and inflate asset bubbles to create more phantom
collateral… (p.21)
This diversion of resources from the productive to the unproductive economy is most
noticeable in declining rates of investment in technological innovation (Lazonick and
Mazzucato 2013). Financialization and the ideology of shareholder primacy, according to
William Lazonick and Marianna Mazzucato, undermines innovation and prosperity. Specifi-
cally, they maintain that they confuse creating value with extracting value through rent-seeking
(Olson 1982, 2000). These criticisms were well-known by the Institutionalists, something
William Baumol (2004) emphasizes in drawing upon Henry George’s classic, Progress and
Poverty (1879) to raise an important distinction between an authentically entrepreneurial
society and a society that muddles entrepreneurship and rent-seeking and inordinately rewards
Bunearned wealth^ (also see: Baumol 1990).
The current trajectory of financialization dramatically increases inequality (of both oppor-
tunity and result) and insecurity (both personal and national), as well as economic instability
(see: Epstein 2005; Dore 2008; and van der Zwan 2014). Beyond the stock pumping incentives,
skyrocketing executive remuneration, de-unionization, off-shoring, and the proliferation of
financial intermediaries (from private equity and hedge funds to payday loan companies),
financialization has heralded the greatest upward transfer of wealth in the history of humankind.
Meanwhile unlimited leverage and the explosion of increasingly exotic and decreasingly
regulated derivatives markets raised the level of inherent instability (see: Minsky 1992) of
global Bsystemic risk^ to astronomical levels (Haldane and May 2011). If stagnating wages and
diminishing job security were not enough for members of the declining middle class to
contend with, the Bfinancialization of everyday life^ (Martin 2002; van der Zwan 2014) makes
them personally responsible for all the risks that the quants with their myth-ridden financial
theories (see: Perez Caldentey and Vernego 2010) cannot begin to comprehend.
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From Financialization to the Re-Institutionalizing Management Theory
We have made the negative case that many of the elements of bad management theories stem
directly from their overreliance on neo-classical theories that exclude normative, cultural, and
political, as well as economic realities (e.g., institutional evolution and non-equilibrium). A
sustained engagement with the impacts of financialization spells an end for management
theory based on shareholder primacy and raises fundamental issues of identifying stakeholders.
The major debate is not between shareholder primacy and more balanced stakeholder ap-
proaches, but rather about the purposes of the firm and its place in larger social systems. This is
a normative investigation to identify the values that firms are responsible for promoting and an
empirical investigation to identify tools from the social sciences that increase our understand-
ing of business and its functions, as well as to help craft management theories that support
prosperity.
Business schools should refashion their curriculum upon a foundation of theories which
explain the role of business institutions in the evolution of society, as well as restore the ethical
content of the management profession. This would focus attention to demands of justice given
business’s role as the major economic institution in contemporary society. Management theory
should be built on insights of theorists who have sought to understand the implications of
financialization during its previous incarnations and who base their theories in a conception of
social and economic justice grounded in a more compelling theory of human nature.
In order to start to restore these elements we turn to the institutional economics from a by-
gone era. Despite its vintage, it is much more scientific in its basic orientation, including
perspectives from a range of social sciences, as well as evolutionary dynamics. Hence it readily
links with emerging notions of homo sociologicus (Anderson 2000), as well as the results
emerging from the realm of complexity economics (Kirman 2011; Arthur 2013). Gregory
Daneke (1999) referred to this terminus of old institutional economics and new complexity
science as Binstitutional ecology (see: Fig. 1).^ It is noteworthy that the old institutionalists
experienced firsthand the social turbulence brought about by previous periods of widespread
financialization, and thus provide invaluable insights into our on-going crisis.
An important part of our argument throughout has focused on how management theory
interacts with and indeed encourages financialization. When we speak of the end of manage-
ment theory, it is because those pieces of ideology that maintain the shareholder primacy
notion in the leading business schools are reduced to absurdity in a world of rabid
financialization. They make a virtue out of predation, and in the process they imperil the
Bprime directive^ of management to extend human organizational capabilities to produce
greater prosperity. By recasting Ghoshal’s observations that business education is rotten at
the core, and augmenting his perspective with the recognition that these Bbad theories^ emerge
from predatory economic practices, perhaps we can provide a new starting point.
Much of the work on values, pro-social norms, and evolution, is done under the rubric of
BComplexity Theory ,^ and thus provides an alternative approach to macro-structures as well as
micro-behaviors. Brian Arthur (2013) explains that the most distinguishing feature of com-
plexity is its focus on non-equilibrium dynamics, while neo-classical economics remains
preoccupied with equilibrium. He explains that
Where equilibrium economics emphasizes order, determinacy, deduction, and stasis,
complexity economics emphasizes contingency, indeterminacy, sense-making, and
openness to change…This view, in other words, gives us a world closer to that of
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political economy than to neoclassical theory, a world that is organic, evolutionary, and
historically-contingent (pp. 1–2).
He proceeds to provide numerous examples, including those from on-going financial crises,
to demonstrate that economics should be primarily about non-equilibrium. Many of the critical
issues relevant to managers are not those of Ballocative efficiency thought markets^. Rather
they involve issues of Bformation^. Arthur explains that formation involves:
…how an economy emerges in the first place, and grows and changes structurally over
time. This is represented by ideas about innovation, economic development, structural
change, and the role of history, institutions, and governance in the economy… (p.17)
If human choice and ideas can influence processes of Bformation^, then we are firmly in the
terrain of political philosophy. Insofar as people have the power to construct and modify
political and economic institutions, they need to ask if these institutions are good and just and
inquire into how they should be changed. To address these and other critical issues (e.g.,
exploitation) inherent in the on-going economic crises, Arthur maintains that Bcomplexity^
should be used to revive Bthe grand tradition of political economy.^ (p.17)
This brings us back to the original version of institutional economics, also known as
evolutionary economics, that Williamson (1985) displaced. Institutionalists were and are
Path Dependency (time, history, and technological lock-ins, as well as adaptive and 
exaptive combinations produce enduring patterns).  
Emergence (interactions produce perpetual novelty and emergent properties so that whole 
is greater than sum of its parts).  
Nonlinearity (feedback driven distortions, chaotic and cascading effects, as well as far-
from equilibrium dynamics). 
Co-evolution of Agents and their Institutions (Agency as well as self-organization; 
involving biology as well as rules, rituals, regulation; and designs). 
Complexity Science Tools (bottom-up simulations using adaptive algorithms, cellular 
automata, evolutionary games, fuzzy sets, and safe-fail resiliency tests).   
*Adapted from Daneke, 1999 
Traditional Institutional Concerns (norms, culture, individual traits, and political power 
shape the course of industrial transformation). 
Collective Behavior (bounded rationality, cooperation, altruism, fairness, and 
reciprocation shape individual choices).  
Fig. 1 Elements of institutional ecology*Adapted from Daneke 1999
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diverse, but generally share an evolutionary approach and integrated elements of law, history,
and anthropology, as well as ecology to explain fundamental transitions in the nature of
commerce. This broad, multi-disciplinary evolutionary approach is not easily modeled, but
this in itself should alert theorists to the complexity of the systems in which they are
embedded. Furthermore, the original institutional economists sought to understand how the
societies arrive at their normative priorities, as well as how conflicts were resolved between
traditions and technological change. In particular, these original Institutionalists provide cogent
insights into the forces most dramatically exhibited in financial crises and corporate scandals
of the last few decades.
For example, John R. Commons’ (1862–1945) initial focus was on changing labor relations
during the evolution from Bmerchant capitalism^ to Bindustrial capitalism^ and on toward
Bfinancial capitalism^, in his four volume History of Labor in the United States (1918–1935).
He also set out general parameters of the institutional approach in his classics the Legal
Foundations of Capitalism (1924), and Institutional Economics (1934). Commons was among
the first to notice how the evolution of finance suspended the basic cause-effect relationships
of the real economy. He contended that the purpose of this sleight of hand was to wrestle the
basic decisions of production out of the hands of industrialists and pass them on to the
financiers. The ebb and flow of production, employment and consumption could thus be
gradually taken away from travails of the market.
The greatest guide to current crises is Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929). In his classic Theory
of the Leisure Class (1899), he observed how of the persistence of various Bbarbaric^ relics
(e.g., predation) could retard, or even reverse, the evolution of industry and culminate in a neo-
feudal BGilded Age^. Much like today, the institutions of Veblen’s time amplified evolutionary
distortions so as to make rent extraction much more rewarding than productive activities. In his
later work, the Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), he explores this dichotomy at greater
length, and explains how emerging financial motives and methods become embedded business
institutions. At the peak of the industrial age, Veblen foretold the great unraveling through the
consolidation of ownership and evolution into a purely Bpecuniary^ enterprise. That is, it was
evolving from the manufacture of goods towards the manufacture of money.
Veblen was heralding the waning of the productive economy and rise of the Bcredit
economy .^ The dark side of this Bmonetary theory of production,^ is that corporations would
conspire with institutions to delimit competition and forestall technological advances. Further-
more, according to Veblen, fraudulent valuations, over capitalization, and underinvestment in
innovation combine with unproductive consumption to fuel chronic depressions, wiping out
large portions of the over-leveraged real economy in the process. Though Veblen rarely made
his normative presuppositions explicit, this institutional analysis is grounded in a business
ethics that situates production in a vision of a good society.
An institutional ecology approach (see: Daneke 1999) to business management has been
lurking just off stage for decades. Many of its methodological antecedents can be found
remnants of systems theory and cybernetics from the 1960s. Prior to Porter much of strategic
management was based on the old systems theories. When the focus of systems research in the
hard sciences shifted to persistent problems of nonlinearity (e.g., dissipative structures and
self-organization), and computational advances made explorations of chaos and complexity
mathematics more tractable, a new science of complex adaptive systems was born (see:
Prigogine 1980). A small handful of social scientists joined this enterprise at the University
of Michigan and Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, and following the popularization of
their efforts in the best seller Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos and
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Order (Waldrop 1992), a few management scholars and/or corporate consultants began to take
notice (e.g., Stacey 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). This interest was mostly metaphorical,
epistemologically naive, and generally short-lived. However, less ambitious and more sophis-
ticated applications of complexity methods found their way into multiple nooks and crannies
of business research, especially operations management and behavioral finance (see: Farmer
and Geanakoplos 2008).
Unfortunately, many of those who used the complexity tools failed to appreciate complexity
concepts, and economists in particular saw it as occasionally useful addendum to neo-classical
theory. As Brian Arthur (2013) explains, Bcomplexity economics is not a special case of
neoclassical economics. On the contrary, equilibrium economics is a special case of non-
equilibrium and hence complexity economics (p. 19).^ Moreover, it is indeed Ba different
framework for economic thought^ (p.1), particularly if it can be integrated with traditional
institutional concerns, as Arthur prescribes. An ecological approach recognizes, first and
foremost, that a firm, and industry, and entire economy are living Bopen systems^. In this
regard, it shares some perspectives with Bgeneral systems theory^ (see: Bertalanffy 1968).
Many of the most successful applications of earlier systems thinking, however, was in closed or
mechanical systems, and have little in common with the study of complex systems. The most
profound distinction between the old and new systems thinking is a critical feature of com-
plexity science generally and social systems in particular. Old systems thinking was often top
down, whereas in new systems thinking complexity evolves in novel ways, from the bottom-up,
through the interaction of agents. Nonetheless, this individualism is not the same as the
autonomy that holds sway in the aggregate for neo-classical economics, for complexity scholars
take as the unit of analysis the patterns of interaction that result in emergent properties (Epstein
and Axtell 1996). Just as chaos theory is the search for order, complexity is the search for
simplicity, as in simple micro rules and traits that co-evolve with emergent macro structures.
Institutional ecology using complexity tools seeks to understand under what institutional
arrangements authentic industrial innovations are more likely to emerge. As Joseph
Schumpeter (1912/1961) observed, technological innovations are inherently disruptive – a
process he called Bcreative destruction^. A healthy economy requires these sources of non-
equilibrium. Without them the processes of adaptation and renewal quickly stagnate.
Schumpeter had faith in Bspontaneous order^, what we now understand to be self-organizing
dynamics augmenting Darwinian gradualism at the social scale. Nonetheless, he ultimately
forecast that financial capitalists would conspire to defeat his heroic entrepreneurs, and gum up
the works of evolution. Beginning with the persistent extension of limited liability to financial
firms as well as he explosion of unproductive wealth (Kingston 2012) amid the fortification of
global mercantilism (Daneke 1998), not to mention the diversion of armies of engineers from
industrial activities, the processes of financialization eventually undermined the very essence
Schumpeterian innovation. As Brian Arthur (2013) points out complexity economics/political
economy (which he also refers to as an Becological approach^) is especially well suited to
explain how things are likely to break down, and how the interconnections broadcast or cascade
the failure. Institutional ecology seeks to locate resiliency in systems, places where it is safe to
fail, rather than fail safe. In late 2008, famed biologist, Robert May and his team ran a clinic, as
it were, in the pages of Nature, entitled, BComplex Systems: Ecology for Bankers^. Essentially
it contends that banking’s vast webs of counterparty risk, designed to be fail safe, are in fact a
disaster of biblical proportions waiting to happen. If management scholars could be encouraged
to give an ecological approach another and more earnest try, perhaps they would begin to see
that the fate of firms should not be so closely wedded to the fate of the financial system.
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Conclusions
Management theorists wishing to take up the gauntlet from Ghoshal’s ghost and Bbegin to
chart a new course by laying claim to a higher purpose (Ghoshal et al. 1999: 20)^ need a
normative account of management theory and conceptual tools to bring it into reality. Criticism
alone is insufficient. We have contended that management theorists need a new research
paradigm, rooted in the social sciences, and guided by an ethical conception of a business in a
just society. Theories should reflect on the function of management within a theory of justice
that situates business in its larger institutional context. The old institutionalists pioneered a
research program that provided conceptual tools vindicated by recent work in complexity
theory and institutional ecology. These approaches, though devoid of the Bpretense of
knowledge^ (Ghoshal 2005) of agency theory and neo-institutionalism, nonetheless provide
a more realistic conception of human nature, more subtle tools for analyzing the interaction of
agents under different sets of structural constraints, and a welcome modesty for practitioners
attempting to intervene in complex systems. Once we recognize how bad management theories
have fueled the current époque of rampant financialization, we can resurrect better manage-
ment theories to serve society.
Paul Samuelson once remarked that, Bin economics, it takes a theory to kill a theory; facts
can only dent the hide^ (cited in Boyer and Smith 2001, p.207). Enriched management
approaches are required now. As suggested, economics in particular and management theory
generally would be much more scientific as well as ethically enlightened if they fully
integrated and not merely co-opted insights from diverse disciplines such as psychology,
anthropology, and ecology – not to mention social and political philosophy and ethics. The
Classical Institutionalist School (particularly Veblen) had such an orientation, and these
perspectives open the door for powerful computational tools and concepts which have already
demonstrated widespread applications in the physical sciences, namely Complex Adaptive
Systems. Management theorists once had a faddish interest in these concepts (and a passing
familiarity with the tools). It is high time for a more earnest involvement.
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